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Comments
WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA:
ON THE BRINK OF FULL COMPENSATION
Since the 19th century, California courts have mechanically de-
nied recovery for mental anguish damages in wrongful death ac-
tions, despite strong policy reasons to the contrary. This Comment
discusses the inconsistencies that exist when outdated legal doc-
trine precludes compensation for a recognized, legitimate element
of damages, and proposes that mental anguish damages be recog-
nized in wrongful death actions. Additionally, this Comment ex-
plores the concept of "hedonic value" and its potential application
in wrongful death damage assessment.
INTRODUCTION
The decedent was a loving husband and devoted father of three.'
His nine year marriage, which had produced a close-knit family, en-
ded abruptly when he was killed at age thirty-three in an air crash.'
Despite the family's sudden, tragic loss, the California Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reiterated the harsh rule that damages for
grief and sorrow are not recoverable in an action for wrongful death.
Though confronted with the argument that the awardable damages
were "out-of-touch with 20th century reality," the court responded
that the doctrine of stare decisis4 compelled its conclusion. Wrongful
death decisions for the last century5 have echoed the same refrain:
Damages for mental anguish6 are not recoverable in California.
I. The factual scenario arose out of Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983).
2. Id. at 518-19, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
3. Id. at 519, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
4. Id.
5. See Dickinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 727, 158 P. 183 (1916); Bond v.
United R.Rs., 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 366 (1911); Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534,
55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966).
6. The term "mental disturbance" is used to encompass fright, shock or other
mental or emotional harm and resulting physical consequences. W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
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Although the California Supreme Court has been hailed as the
most creative, progressive judicial body in the United States,7 it has
refused to reassess its justification for denying wrongful death
mental anguish claims in light of modern negligence precepts. As
wrongful death scholar Steven Speiser wrote, "[t]he reasons for de-
nial of mental anguish damages in death cases have long ago disap-
peared, but the rule lingers on as an historical anomaly." 8
Wrongful death damages have been examined carefully by writ-
ers, especially as tort law has grown to acknowledge the authenticity
of mental or emotional suffering.9 One notable analysis is provided
by coauthors Speiser and Malawer, 10 who argue persuasively for uni-
versal recognition of mental anguish damages in death actions. Judi-
cial and legislative response has been hesitant,11 indicating a willing-
ness to cling to long accepted and well known principles rather than
to incorporate much needed change.
California common law provides an appropriate backdrop for dis-
cussion of the existing inconsistencies in the law of wrongful death
damages. Recent California developments have provided courts with
the legal resources necessary to more fully compensate wrongful
death plaintiffs. This Comment's objective is to identify reasons
founded in policy and law that require recognition of mental anguish
damages in death actions. Further, this Comment will discuss the
possibility of complete reform of wrongful death damages based
upon new economic theory concerning the value of human life.
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 359-60 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Courts and writers have used the terms
"mental and emotional disturbance," "mental and emotional distress" and "mental
anguish" interchangeably to describe all forms of psychic damage. No uniform identifi-
able meaning seems to have been attached to each phrase, and careful reading of opin-
ions and articles can lead to confusion.
This Comment will refer to "mental anguish" as a subcategory of mental disturbance,
defined as follows: "[A]s a ground for divorce or damages or an element of damages,
[mental anguish] includes the mental suffering resulting from the excitation of the more
poignant and painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation,
wounded pride, shame, public humiliation, despair, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889
(5th ed. 1979).
7. Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981).
8. 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:55 (2d ed. 1975).
9. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 360.
10. Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of
Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
11. In 1976, eight states allowed mental anguish damages in wrongful death ac-
tions. Id. Fourteen states now allow such damages. See infra notes 111-12.
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BACKGROUND
The Evolution of Wrongful Death Damages
Lord Ellenborough's ruling in Baker v. Bolton,
12 an 1808 English
case, has controlled wrongful death common law development 
in
England and the United States. He stated, "[I]n a civil Court, the
death of a human being [can] not be complained of as an injury."'
3
Courts throughout the United States adopted the Baker 
standard, 4




Lord Campbell's Act,'6 passed by Parliament in 1846, 
laid to rest
the rule of Baker v. Bolton in England. The statute allowed 
benefi-
ciaries of the deceased to bring a separate action in which 
the jury
could award damages proportional to the survivors' 
injury. Al-
though the language of the Act was broad and seemed 
to afford the
jury a great deal of discretion, English courts quickly restricted the
scope of awardable damages.
Six years after the passage of Lord Campbell's Act, Lord 
Coler-
idge, in Blake v. Midland Railway Co.,'
8 ruled that wrongful death
damages would be subjected to a "pecuniary loss" limitation, and on
that basis denied the plaintiffs compensation for injured emotions.'
9
The Blake court's reasoning, however, is self-contradictory. 
Pecuni-
ary damages are defined as those damages capable 
of being esti-
mated in, and compensated by, money.
20 Thus, imposing a pecuniary
loss limitation served no purpose other than to restate the 
function of
the jury - to reduce legitimate damage elements to monetary
terms. Nevertheless, courts and legislatures following the 
Blake rea-
12. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
13. id.
14. Early American courts were not opposed to providing 
recovery. See Cross v.
Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794). However, as courts began to follow 
the Baker v. Bol-
ton holding, those early decisions were ignored. See generally 
S. SPEISER, supra note 8, §
1:4.
15. Hawaii, however, created and retained a common-law 
right of action. See
Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209 (1860).
16. Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed 
by Accidents, 9 & 10
Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
17. Id. Beneficiaries were allowed to sue although the conduct 
resulting in death
was a felony.
18. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852).
19. Id. at 93, 111, 118 Eng. Rep. at 35, 41-42. For more 
historical detail, see
Note, Blind Imitation of the Past: An Analysis of Pecuniary Damages 
in Wrongful
Death Actions, 49 DENV. L.J. 99 (1972).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1979).
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soning construed pecuniary loss to mean a death beneficiary's expec-tation of future monetary benefit, 21 thereby preventing recovery formental anguish and other legitimate damage elements.In 1862, the California Legislature enacted the state's first wrong-ful death statute,22 which allowed the jury to award those pecuniaryand exemplary damages deemed fair and just under the circum-stances. In 1873, the words "pecuniary and exemplary" were re-moved from the statute, an amendment that remains in effect to-day.23 The current section 377 of the California Code of CivilProcedure reads, in pertinent part, "[iun every action under this sec-tion, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances ofthe case, may be just .. "24Although the language of the wrongful death statute imposed norestriction on damage awards other than a requirement of fairness,California courts imitated the judicial conservatism of the earlierEnglish courts. The pecuniary loss limitation was quickly adopted,appearing in California Supreme Court opinions as early as 1890. InMunro v. Pacific Coast Dredging and Reclamation Co., 5 a wrongfuldeath action was brought after an individual was killed by defend-ant's negligent blasting.28 Relying upon Blake v. Midland RailwayCo., 27 the court allowed damages for plaintiff's pecuniary loss andfor the loss of comfort, society, support and protection of the de-
21. Id. at 1018.22. An Act Requiring Compensation for Causing Death by Wrongful Act, Neg-lect, or Default, 1862 Cal. Stat. 447.23. See Code Amendments 1873-1874, ch. 383, § 40. For a history of the amend-ments to the wrongful death statute, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973) andCAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering 1972).24. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1986) provides:When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect ofanother, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may main-tain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case ofthe death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of suchwrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the personinjured. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect,the action may also be maintained against such other person, or in case of hisor her death, his or her personal representatives. In every action under thissection, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case,may be just, but shall not include damages recoverable under Section 573 ofthe Probate Code. The respective rights of the heirs in any award shall bedetermined by the court. Any action brought by the personal representatives ofthe decedent pursuant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Codemay be joined with an action arising out of the same wrongful act or neglectbrought pursuant to the provisions of this section. If an action be brought pur-suant to the provisions of this section and a separate action arising out of thesame wrongful act or neglect be brought pursuant to the provisions Section 573of the Probate Code, such actions shall be consolidated for trial on the motionof any interested party.
25. 84 Cal. 515, 24 P. 303 (1890).26. Id. at 517, 24 P. at 305.27. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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ceased. However, the court ruled that damages for mental anguish
were too vague and uncertain to be recoverable, noting that permit-
ting recovery for grief, sorrow and mental suffering would allow the
jury an opportunity to return wild, excessive verdicts.2 8 In a subse-
quent decision, the California Supreme Court clarified that recovery
for comfort, society, support and protection also was limited to pecu-
niary value.29 The resulting Munro doctrine governed California de-
cisions for the next eighty-one years.30
Adherence to a strict Blake "pecuniary" standard for recovery of
clearly intangible items caused confusion both to juries and to lower
courts. Opinions containing circular language and reasoning abound.
One court stated, "It is not possible to measure in exact terms of
money the loss which a surviving husband, wife, or child may have
sustained through being deprived of the comfort and society of the
deceased . . . But in fixing the amount, the jury is always bound
by the fundamental rule that pecuniary damage is the limit of recov-
ery . "3... 31 However, this artificial pecuniary standard began to
lose its meaning as courts expanded the scope of recoverable dam-
ages to include advice and training, 2 family closeness,3 3 warmth of
feeling between members of the family,3 4 and the kind, loving char-
acter of the deceased. 5
In 1977 the California Supreme Court in Krouse v. Graham36 ac-
knowledged that certain aspects of wrongful death damage awards
were not pecuniary in nature:
To direct the jury, on one hand, to limit plaintiff's recovery to pecuniary
losses alone while also compensating the plaintiff for loss of such nonpecu-
niary factors as the society, comfort, care and protection of a decedent is
calculated to mislead and invite confusion. Instead, a simple instruction ex-
cluding considerations of grief and sorrow in wrongful death actions will
normally suffice.
37
28. Munro, 84 Cal. at 524-25, 24 P. at 305.
29. Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 47 P. 139 (1896).
30. See, e.g., Parsons v. Easton, 184 Cal. 764, 195 P. 419 (1921); Burk v. Arcata
& Mad River R., 125 Cal. 364, 57 P. 1065 (1899); Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. Ry., 118
Cal. 55, 50 P. 25 (1897); Estate of D'India, 63 Cal. App. 3d 942, 134 Cal. Rptr. 165
(1976); Fields v. Riley, I Cal. App. 3d 308, 81 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1969); Zeller v. Reid, 38
Cal. App. 2d 622, 101 P.2d 730 (1940).
31. Dickinson v. Southern Pac. Co., 172 Cal. 727, 731, 158 P. 183, 185
(1916)(emphasis in original).
32. Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966).
33. Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
34. Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1967).
35. Cook v. Clay St. Hill R.R., 60 Cal. 604 (1882).
36. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
37. Id. at 69, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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Although the court allowed recovery for some nonpecuniary loss,
the opinion, without adequate explanation, denied recovery for
mental anguish damages.
Krouse has become the cornerstone case for modern assessment of
wrongful death damages in California. The California Book of Ap-
proved Jury Instructions reflects the Krouse standards; juries are di-
rected to award reasonable damages for loss of love, companionship,
comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support, loss of enjoyment
of sexual relations and loss of assistance in the home. However, ju-
ries may not award damages for grief or sorrow suffered by wrongful
death plaintiffs. 8
Damages for Mental Anguish
The unusual history of wrongful death damages inhibited the pos-
sible development of a common law right of recovery for mental
anguish. Writers have stated convincingly that had courts not re-
frained from fashioning common law remedies, developments in
wrongful death actions probably would have paralleled those in per-
sonal injury actions.3 9 Although Lord Campbell's Act did not pre-
vent courts from acting independently, a belief persisted after Baker
v. Bolton that recovery for wrongful death was not permitted at
common law.40
The statutory origins of wrongful death law in California indi-
cated a legislative intent to leave the issue of damages to judicial
discretion. California courts were presented with an opportunity to
correct the injustice of Baker v. Bolton; instead, judges tied them-
selves to English historical coattails.
RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: Dillon AND Molien
California courts have had a rich legacy of revolutionizing tort law
concepts. In particular, personal injury cases indicate the willingness
of California jurists to expand recovery for mental disturbance dam-
ages. Nonetheless, this forward-looking approach has not been uti-
lized in assessing damages in wrongful death actions. Speiser and
Malawer wrote, "[J]uries are permitted to consider and quantify the
damaging effects of mental anguish in personal injury cases, but are
prohibited from even considering mental anguish of bereaved rela-
tives in most American wrongful death cases . . .
The authors concentrated on Dillon v. Legg,42 decided in 1968. In
38. 2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 14.50 (7th ed. 1986).
39. See generally Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 2-8; C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 363-64 (1935).
40. See Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 8.
41. Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 2.
42. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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Dillon, the California Supreme Court allowed a woman to recover
for emotional distress suffered when she witnessed her daughter's
death. The court asserted that the decision released state law from
its nineteenth century chains.43 Though Dillon expanded the field of
potential plaintiffs, the holding limited recovery to those who exper-
ienced a physical manifestation of distress, a requirement imposed at
the time for all emotional distress victims." In 1980, the California
Supreme Court again acted on behalf of emotional distress plaintiffs
in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.45 In Molien, the plaintiff
alleged that his marriage failed after his wife's illness was negli-
gently diagnosed as syphilis.46 The court held that a cause of action
would lie for negligent infliction of emotional distress without a
showing of physical injury.47
The two landmark decisions are distinguished by the respective
plaintiffs: Dillon allowed recovery to bystanders experiencing emo-
tional distress as a result of contemporaneous sensory observance of
negligently inflicted harm toward another;48 Molien permitted emo-
tional distress recovery for foreseeable "direct" victims of an actor's
negligence.49
The cases differ in another significant way. The Dillon court inter-
preted emotional distress to mean "shock" or "trauma,"50 confining
the term to the more readily perceivable aspects of mental distur-
bance. Although the Molien court used similar language, the phrase
"emotional distress" was construed more broadly: "[T]he attempted
distinction between physical and psychological injury merely
cloud[ed] the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether
the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should
not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classification
scheme." '
The Molien court abolished the distinction between physical and
psychological injury by allowing recovery for emotional distress in
the form of mental anguish. The court stated, "[I]t is rational to
anticipate that both husband and wife would experience anxiety, sus-
43. Id. at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
44. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
45. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
46. Id. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
47. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
48. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
49. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
50. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
51. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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picion, and hostility52 when confronted with what they had every
reason to believe was reliable medical evidence of a particularly nox-
ious infidelity. 53
After Dillon and Molien, plaintiffs could expect compensation forthe entire range of mental disturbance injuries; the difficulty lay onlyin classifying plaintiffs as bystanders or direct victims. Goodwin v.Reilly,54 a recent appellate court opinion, held that to state a valid
cause of action as a direct victim, the plaintiff must allege facts
showing a relationship with the physically injured party such that
the tort has been committed against plaintiff himself. Under this for-
mulation, wrongful death beneficiaries clearly may be viewed as di-
rect victims. When an actor's conduct causes death, bereaved rela-
tives are unquestionably foreseeable; because the injury has resultedin death, if emotional distress has been inflicted, grieving survivors
are the only possible recipients.
One court has implicitly recognized wrongful death beneficiaries
as emotional distress victims. In Sesma v. Cueto,55 parents brought
concurrent actions for emotional distress and wrongful death when,
as a result of medical malpractice, their child died at birth. TheFourth District Court of Appeal focused upon the Molien principle
that negligently administered medical care could be directed not
only to the patient, but also to the patient's spouse. The court ex-
tended the principle to include the parents of a patient, holding thatboth the father and mother could allege facts to state a Molien di-
rect victim cause of action."6
Although Sesma potentially has broadened the meaning of "direct
victim," it does not suggest that courts will apply the Molien criteria
to wrongful death actions in the future. The narrow Sesma holding
allowed recovery to wrongful death plaintiffs only when the defend-
ant has engaged in medical malpractice, and only in a companion
suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress. One year later, inCanavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,57 the Fourth District Court ofAppeal rejected an argument, based on both Molien and Sesma, to
extend mental anguish recovery to plaintiffs in a wrongful death ac-
tion. The court denied recovery because the plaintiffs failed to plead
an indepedent cause of action for emotional distress, and because
emotional distress damages are not recoverable in an action for
52. Anxiety, suspicion and hostility are three "poignant emotions" which may beclassified in the "mental anguish" subcategory of mental disturbance. See supra note 6.53. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.54. 176 Cal. App. 3d 86, 98, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374, 380 (1985).55. 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982).
56. Id. at 116-17, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 16.57. 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983). See supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
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wrongful death.58
The reasoning of the Canavin court is internally inconsistent, yet
the case probably marks the line beyond which the direct victim con-
cept will not reach. However, further expansion of Molien may not
be necessary in order to compensate wrongful death beneficiaries for
mental anguish. Another line of California cases provides an estab-
lished basis for compensating the emotional upheaval accompanying
the death of a loved one.
POST-MORTEM ANGUISH
Prior to Molien and its progeny, California courts required a phys-
ical manifestation of emotional distress in order to ensure claim va-
lidity.59 Prosser and Keeton noted that a physical manifestation was
not required by courts in two special circumstances: cases involving
negligent transmission of a message announcing death and those
concerning negligent mishandling of a corpse.6 0
58. Id. at 520, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court stated:
Preliminarily, Molien and [Sesma] are inapposite, because the Canavins
neither pleaded an independent cause of action for personal injury based upon
emotional distress arising from PSA's negligent killing of decedent, nor alleged
they had suffered any damage as a result of grief and sorrow. Neither did they
offer to amend their pleadings to state an action for emotional distress.
The Canavin court's reasoning reflects the difficulties courts have encountered in at-
tempting to justify the denial of mental anguish damages in death actions. The court
here did not dismiss the possibility of recovery for emotional distress; instead, the court
inferred that the plaintiffs could prevail in a separate action for emotional distress. Un-
fortunately, all of the legitimate damages suffered by the family were not compensable in
the most appropriate forum - the wrongful death action.
The court continued,
More basically, Molien is inapposite because emotional injuries to the heirs are
not relevant to a cause of action for wrongful death. "Rather, the measure of
damages [in a wrongful death action] is the value of the benefits the heirs
could reasonably expect to receive from the deceased if [he or] she had lived
.... " In other words, "[ilt is the probable value of the decedent's life to those
for whom the action is brought .... " It does not include the value of the
independent, non-derivative effects of the loss of the decedent upon the heirs.
Id., 196 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court's statement here is based upon language in Syah v.
Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 55 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1966), which stated, "The measure of
damages in a wrongful death case is the amount the heirs were receiving at the time of
the death of the decedent and what such heirs would have received had the decedent
lived." Id. at 546, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (emphasis added). The Canavin court ignores the
italicized words and fails to recognize the invasion of the heirs' right to mental tranquil-
ity - destroyed by the absence of the decedent. See infra notes 106-07 and accompany-
ing text. The court simply errs in labeling mental anguish "independent" and "non-deriv-
ative"; the death of the decedent is a cause in fact of the heirs' mental anguish - "but
for" the death of the decedent, the heirs would not have suffered emotionally.
59. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 925, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
60. PRossER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 362.
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Although no message transmission cases have been decided in Cal-
ifornia, two appellate decisions have made clear that mishandling of
a corpse gives rise to a cause of action for survivors' emotional dis-
tress. The first, Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary,"1 de-
cided in 1959, awarded damages for mental and emotional distress
to children who became ill upon discovering that their father's im-
properly preserved body had been damaged in shipment. 2 The com-
plaint asserted that damages occurred as a result of defendants' neg-
ligence. Because the plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered physical
manifestations of distress, the court held that a question of fact ex-
isted for jury consideration.63
Twenty-one years later, a second case firmly established the legal
precepts governing recovery for corpse mishandling. In Allen v.
Jones,6 4 the plaintiff sued a mortuary to recover for mental distress
suffered when his brother's cremated remains were lost in transit
while in the defendant's care. 5 The court acknowledged California
decisions awarding damages for mental distress for the breach of a
mortician's service contract, 6 and held that the plaintiff stated a
cause of action in tort.67 Justice Tamura wrote for the majority:
We conclude that damages are recoverable for mental distress without
physical injury for negligent mishandling of a corpse by a mortuary. Publicpolicy requires that mortuaries adhere to a high standard of care in view of
the psychological devastation likely to result from any mistake which upsets
the expectations of the decedent's bereaved family. 8
The court accepted the Restatement of Torts position that rejected
the supposed property basis of the cause of action,69 recognizing that
the plaintiffs stated a claim for mental distress alone.70
Four months before the California Supreme Court decided
Molien, the Allen court applied the principle of recovery for negli-
61. 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959).
62. Id. at 43, 335 P.2d at 182.
63. Id.
64. 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
65. Id. at 210, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
66. Id. at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449; see Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196
P.2d 915 (1948).
67. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
68. Id. at 214, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 213-14, 163 Cal. Rptr. 449-50. The opinion refers to section 868 of the
RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS, which states:
The technical basis of the cause of action is the interference with the exclu-
sive right of control of the body, which frequently has been called by the courts
a "property" or a "quasi-property" right. This does not, however, fit very well
into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold or trans-
ferred, has no utility and can be used only for the one purpose of interment or
cremation. In practice, the technical right has served as a mere peg upon which
to hang damages for the mental distress inflicted upon the survivor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 comment a (1977).
70. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 215, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
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gent infliction of emotional distress without physical injury to a
corpse mishandling case. The Allen court, concerned with plaintiffs
already bereaved by the loss of a family member, awarded damages
for the additional anguish suffered as a result of corpse mishan-
dling.7" The court was able to distinguish and quantify a specific por-
tion of the survivors' mental anguish; the same court would have felt
constrained by precedent and therefore unable to respond if the
death itself had been caused by a tortfeasor's negligence, and the
mental anguish had been claimed in an action for wrongful death.
ANALYSIS
Debate over mental anguish damage awards in wrongful death ac-
tions is not new; courts repeatedly have been criticized for their in-
flexible denial of recovery.72 The Molien court stated that whether a
plaintiff has suffered a compensable injury is a matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact.7 In wrongful death actions, however,
compensation for mental anguish injury always has been rejected as
a matter of law. The rationale, stated in Krouse v. Graham, is that
"[n]othing can be recovered as [solace] for lost feelings"74 - an
unsupportable position in light of Molien and Allen.
Mental anguish damages clearly have been established as compen-
sable.7 5 Judicial efficiency is frustrated by a system that denies such
damages in a death action, yet satisfies the same claim by the same
plaintiff in a companion suit for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress .7  The task facing the California judiciary is one of acknowl-
edgment: courts must recognize that strong policies already exist to
support recovery for mental anguish by wrongful death beneficiaries.
Mental anguish should be treated as any other issue in dispute - as
a matter to be alleged and proven by the plaintiff. As Speiser and
71. Allen has provided a basis for large emotional distress damage awards arising
from corpse mishandling. A recent verdict awarded the plaintiff $72,500 when the wrong
body was sent by the mortuary to the viewing. Durr v. Humphrey Mortuary, No. 394204(Orange Cty. Super. Ct. 1985). A jury in another case awarded a 67-year-old man $1
million in damages for emotional distress suffered when the mortuary switched his wife's
body for the viewing. Thompson v. Palmer d. Whitted & Co., No. 496202-3 (Alameda
City Super. Ct. 1984).
72. See generally S. SPEISER, supra note 8, § 3:55.
73. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
74. Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 69, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
75. See Molien v Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980).
76. See Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1982);
Canavin v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 148 Cal. App. 3d 512, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1983).
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Malawer stated, "Substantial grief should not be assumed to result
automatically from the death of any relative, nor should it be ex-
cluded arbitrarily . . . . In every case, damages for mental anguish
should be based upon proper proof."77
Unfortunately, courts have had difficulty with proof of mental
anguish in death actions. Allowing awards for such allegedly nebu-
lous injuries as "grief" and "sorrow" seems to create conceptual ob-
stacles for courts, but calculation of mental anguish damages by a
jury is no more problematic than calculation of other intangibles
such as loss of love or companionship. 8 Courts and juries are now
particularly well-equipped to assess intangible damage elements due
to the availability of scientific and psychological data and expert tes-
timony.79 Attorney and psychiatrist Joseph T. Smith stresses that ex-
pert testimony is invaluable to the jury function: "A duly qualified
expert can explain the nature of mental suffering, of the grieving
process . . . . When the jury understands the psychological reason-
ing and when it believes in the reality of the phenomenon, it is more
likely to award appropriate damages."'80
Cases such as Dillon and Molien suggest that California courts
have come to trust the judgment capabilities of modern juries, but
the greatest obstacle to wrongful death damage reform still may be
the concern expressed in the 1890 Munro decision - that juries, left
to their own devices, will produce extravagant awards.81 However,
77. Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 22.
78. S. SPEISER, supra note 8, § 3:55.
79. See, e.g., Werchick, Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS
L. 263 (1965); Holmes & Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, I I PSYCHO-
SOMATIC RESEARCH 213 (1967); Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL 7
(July 1977).
80. Smith, The Expert Witness: Maximizing Damages for Psychic Injury, 18
TRIAL 51, 52 (Apr. 1982). Dr. Smith emphasizes that an expert witness can help guide
the jury to decide the amount of damages to award to the particular plaintiff:
The expert witness not only can present the broad theory of grief, bereavement,
and stressful life events embraced by modern psychiatry and psychology, but
also can place the individual client somewhere within this framework ....
IT]he same event will have a different impact on each and every individual
... . The lawyer who works together with a psychiatrist or psychologist will
be able to put together a complete and convincing case for damages for suffer-
ing and mental pain. Psychiatrists can present the effects of loss on the quality
of the life of the survivor in graphic terms, whether the survivor's reaction be
normal or pathological. Only in this way can we assure that survivors of such
losses collect the full amount of damages to which they are entitled.
Id. at 55.
81. Emphasis on fear of runaway jury verdicts was minimized in Krouse v. Gra-
ham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), but the court made note
of it, quoting Bond v. United R.Rs. of San Francisco, 159 Cal. 270, 285, 113 P. 366, 372
(1911): "[I]t is evident to us, however, from the cases that have come before us, that it
often leads to extravagant verdicts in which the jury, in fact, allow a supposed compensa-
tion for sad emotions and injured feelings." Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 68-69, 562 P.2d at
1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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even assuming that juries are incapable of acting sensibly, several
options exist to ensure damage limitation. First, judicial review of
jury verdicts allows courts to verify the reasonableness of damage
awards. The verdict in a wrongful death action is subject to the ap-
proval of the trial judge, and on appeal, a reviewing court may inter-
vene if the facts suggest that passion, prejudice or corruption influ-
enced the amount of the award.8 2 But the jury is given deference; the
award will not be disturbed unless it is so disproportionate as to sug-
gest impropriety.8 3
Legislative action is another option to assure reasonable wrongful
death damage awards. Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code
provides that, in medical malpractice actions, damage awards for
noneconomic losses may not exceed $250,000.84 In Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,"5 the California Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of section 3333.2: "While the general propriety
of such damages is, of course, firmly imbedded in our common law
jurisprudence . . . no California case of which we are aware has
ever suggested that the right to recover for such noneconomic inju-
ries is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revi-
sion."86 The court recognized that no principle of federal or state law
prevented the legislature from limiting recovery of damages in fur-
therance of a legitimate state interest.8 7 The state interest involved
in Fein was the concern over rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums, a situation that had reached crisis proportions. 8 A simi-
lar worry seems to plague judges in wrongful death actions, " 'a
lively fear [that] the overenthusiasm of sympathetic juries would
lead to excessive awards and increased insurance premiums.'-"9 Be-
cause of the perception that juries may tend to favor injured plain-
tiffs, because defendants generally are insured,90 a legislative cap on
damages might reduce potential judicial and societal concern about
acceptance of mental anguish awards in death actions.
Another available method of preventing windfall recovery is par-
82. Griott v. Gamblin, 194 Cal. App. 2d 577, 15 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1961).
83. Bechtold v. Bishop & Co., 16 Cal. 2d 285, 105 P.2d 984 (1940).
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1982).
85. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
86. Id. at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
87. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
88. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
89. Finkeltein, Pickrel, and Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric
Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884, 885 (1974)
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 907 (4th ed. 1971)).
90. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 590.
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tial modification of the collateral source rule.91 At common law, a
jury calculating damages could not consider insurance payments and
other independent benefits that the plaintiff received to compensate
for the injury sustained.92 The California Legislature in Civil Code
section 3333.1 modified the traditional rule in connection with medi-
cal malpractice actions.93 The effect of the statute was to reduce
damage awards by allowing evidence of plaintiff's net collateral ben-
efits." In death actions, evidence of the heir's wealth or poverty is
inadmissible; damages are assessed based solely upon loss to the ben-
eficiaries.95 An appropriate modification of the collateral source rule
could allow wrongful death defendants to introduce evidence of
plaintiffs' life insurance benefits, but other indications of wealth or
poverty of beneficiaries would remain inadmissible.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to award mental anguish
damages to wrongful death beneficiaries is a practical one: Mental
anguish is a serious form of injury. The Allen court relied heavily
upon Dean Prosser's assessment that, in a corpse mishandling situa-
tion, "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress
[exists], arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious." 96 Wrongful death actions
involve a similar guarantee. When the tortious conduct of an individ-
ual results in the death of another, the grief suffered by close family
members is undeniably genuine - often it is greater than if the
death had occurred from natural causes. Dr. Smith asserts that the
grief process takes years to complete and that early recovery is not
normal. He states, "The [survivor's] life has been ripped to shreds
and rebuilding is a long and painful process. Significant numbers of
survivors remain depressed long after the original death. 97 In a per-
sonal injury case, the victim's relatives may cling to hope, no matter
how slight, for full or partial recovery. Wrongful death beneficiaries
have no such comfort.
The mental anguish suffered by surviving relatives is compounded
by what would seem to be an unresponsive judicial system.98 Courts
91. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
92. Id. at 165, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 165-66, 695 P.2d at 684-85, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
95. Webb v. Van Noort, 239 Cal. App. 2d 472, 48 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1966).
96. Allen, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 329-30 (4th ed. 1971)).
97. Smith, supra note 80, at 53.
98. Speiser and Malawer, discussing the injustice of denying mental anguish
damages, state:
[Ilf the bereaved relatives accept [that the law refuses to recognize mental
anguish damages], they can be expected to come away from their experience in
litigation with greatly reduced respect for our legal system. If they do not ac-
cept it, and cling to a concept of sentimental or emotional loss, their claims are
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may have a duty to avoid inflicting further damage on plaintiffs
through application of the legal process; courts must at a minimum
provide a remedy for legitimate injury.9 Prosser and Keeton, dis-
cussing mental disturbance in negligence actions, state, "[T]he law
is not for the protection of the physically sound alone. It is the busi-
ness of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress,
even if lawsuits must be multiplied. .. .
As discussed, policy reasons do not prevent courts from fully com-
pensating wrongful death plaintiffs. Instead, California courts have
erected a stare decisis barrier that has withstood the most compel-
ling arguments for its elimination. However, the contradiction inher-
ent in denying mental anguish damages in death actions, while al-
lowing recovery for other intangible damage elements, is readily
exposed through careful scrutiny of the Krouse opinion.
In Krouse v. Graham,'0' the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
that, under principles of California law, damages for "grief and sor-
row" are not recoverable in wrongful death actions.0 2 At the same
time, the court fully approved an award for loss of society, relying
upon Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet:10 3 "It is greatly persuasive
with us that . . . the [United States] Supreme Court interpreted the
term 'society' as including 'a broad range of mutual benefits each
family member receives from the others' continued existence, includ-
ing love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and pro-
tection . . "104
The Krouse court did not acknowledge, and some courts have re-
jected,10 5 the fact that loss of society has the same policy underpin-
then very difficult to adjudicate, and the policies of the courts are further
frustrated.
Speiser & Malawer, supra note 10, at 19.
99. Professor Leon Green asserts:
No society could long endure under law that could not be made to respond to
the needs of its members. A court's limitations are largely those that it imposes
on itself. And, if any American court should seek to bind itself by a rule that
would prevent the correction of its errors or the advance of the cause of justice
beyond its former decisions, it would be held in contempt by every other court
and every informed citizen in the country.
Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part II - Judicial Lawmaking, 64 W. VA. L. REV.
115, 140 (1962).
100. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 360.
101. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
102. Id. at 70, 562 P.2d at 1026, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
103. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
104. Krouse, 19 Cal. 3d at 71, 562 P.2d at 1027, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (quoting
Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 585).
105. See, e.g., Cummins v. Rachner, 257 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
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ning as mental anguish: the right of the individual to mental tran-
quility. Peace of mind is the result of the benefits derived from the
society of another, as well as the contentment and security06 re-
ceived from the mere fact of the other's existence. In that sense, the
loss of the loved one's existence deprives grieving survivors of a posi-
tive contribution to peace of mind;10 7 the loss of that contribution is
manifested by mental anguish. Krouse represents an incomplete at-
tempt to provide compensation for loss of mental tranquility. Al-
though the mental disturbance resulting from loss of society is recog-
nized, the most obvious and serious form of disturbance, mental
anguish, remains barred from consideration.
Some courts have recognized that loss of society and mental
anguish are virtually inseparable. For example, in City of Tucson v.
Wondergem,108 the Arizona Supreme Court found inconsistent the
denial of mental anguish damages with the grant of recovery for loss
of companionship, comfort and guidance. The court stated that be-
cause loss of companionship and comfort results in sorrow, failure to
permit mental anguish damages would violate notions of fairness.109
In any event, courts' efforts to prevent jury consideration of mental
anguish damages may be in vain. "The juror may find it quite diffi-
cult indeed to distinguish a spouse's loss of love from the forbidden
'mental anguish,' with the result, probable in many cases, that sub-
stantial awards will be made for intangible losses under one name or
another." 110
State courts and legislatures have begun to accept the propriety of
awarding mental anguish damages in wrongful death actions. Nine
states now have statutory provisions specifically providing for mental
anguish damage recovery;111 five other states have accomplished the
same result through judicial decree. 11 2 Despite fears of runaway jury
106. The state of mind fostered by the existence of a relative is not necessarily
limited to feelings of contentment and security. Clearly, the continued life of another
may be a source of anxiety, fear, anger, and other unpleasant emotions. Proof of the
plaintiff's completely negative state of mind toward the decedent could be introduced by
the defendant at trial to negate the existence of severe mental anguish.
107. The loss of mental tranquility that gives rise to mental anguish may be analo-
gized to the loss of monetary income that gives rise to undesirable economic conse-
quences. Courts traditionally compensate the latter, even if the economic consequences
are minimal. In comparison, a survivor may feel the residual effects of mental anguish
for years after his or her monetary situation has stabilized.
108. 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970).
109. Id. at 433, 466 P.2d at 387.
110. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 952.
111. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 1985); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
3-904 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02
(Anderson Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1985); VA. CODE§ 8.01-52 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1981).
112. See Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Dobyns v.
Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 119 La. 72, 43 So. 934 (1907); Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines,
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verdicts, statistics indicate that awards and settlements in "mental
anguish" states generally tend to parallel those in jurisdictions that
reject mental anguish damages.113
"HEDONIC" VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
Wrongful death damage law is far from settled, even in the states
that recognize niental anguish damages. The volatile nature of the
subject is assured, due to the sensitive nature of death and the diffi-
culty involved with placing a value on the loss of human life. While
the debate in California has narrowed to a single aspect of nonpecu-
niary damages, expert testimony assessing the value of life has per-
suaded courts in other states to re-evaluate the standards used to
award wrongful death damages.
Some courts have admitted a different type of evidence in wrong-
ful death cases, in an attempt to assess the value of life. For exam-
ple, in Sherrod v. Berry,114 an Illinois federal district court allowed
an economist's testimony concerning the "hedonic" value of human
life. The court noted that legal scholars, economists, and social scien-
tists have struggled, with little success, to formulate a method by
which the value of a human life can be measured in terms under-
stood by a jury. 15 Hedonic value, economist Stanley Smith testified,
referred to the expected pleasure of life, distinct from economic
value, including all the value with which life might be held. 6 The
court accepted Mr. Smith's opinion that the hedonic value of human
life may be worth up to thirty times the economic value of the per-
671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983); Nohrden v. Northeastern R.R. Co., 59 S.C. 87, 37 S.E. 228
(1900); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
113. Jury awards statistics for 1985 indicate the following average amounts (cate-
gorized by type decedent):
"Mental Anguish" states other states
Children: $658,250 $759,420
Single Adults: 1,034,500 1,110,957
Married Men: 874,714 1,023,150
Married Women: 1,679,574 689,460
Other decedents: 629,500 245,160
Statistics are based upon data compiled in VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS 8-13 (1986) (Cu-
mulative Index January-December 1985).
114. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. II1. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987). An
Ohio federal district court in Urseth v. Dayton, No. C-3-84-103 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19,
1986) also has allowed testimony concerning hedonic value of a decedent in a wrongful
death action. Telephone interview with economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
115. 629 F. Supp. at 164.
116. Id. at 163.
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son's life. 117 The court stated, "The fact that the hedonic value of
human life is difficult to measure did not make either [the] testi-
mony or the damages speculative. . . .The rule against recovery of
'speculative damages' is generally directed against uncertainty as to
cause rather than uncertainty as to measure or extent." 1118
The Sherrod court's determination to award hedonic value dam-
ages represents a bold break from traditional assessment of wrongful
death damages. Hedonic value recovery is an entirely new method of
loss evaluation. Every aspect of damage may be considered as thejury reaches a lump-sum verdict based not upon an economic entity,
but upon the value of the person as a whole. Damages for hedonic
value -address the more realistic idea that the true injuries to be com-
pensated in wrongful death actions are intangible in nature; the eco-
nomic loss to beneficiaries is merely one part of the void created by
the death of a loved one.
Hedonic valuation presents an attractive method of achieving full
compensation for wrongful death plaintiffs, but implementation of
the concept poses problems for California and many states. In Sher-
rod v. Berry, the court awarded damages for hedonic value to the
decedent's father as executor of his son's estate.11 9 California's
wrongful death statute precludes awarding to a beneficiary damages
that are recoverable by the estate.1 20 Damages for hedonic value
may still be recoverable, but not in the form contemplated by Sher-
rod. Damages awarded in Sherrod reflected the full hedonic value of
the decedent's life that the decedent would have received, had he
lived. An heir in California, to come within the purview of the
wrongful death statute, would have to prove the derivative hedonic
value that he or she would have received from the decedent's life,
had the decedent lived. 121
117. Id. Mr. Smith, when testifying as an expert witness, informs juries that the
total value of a person's life may be expressed as the sum of that person's pecuniary and
hedonic values. Mr. Smith testifies that hedonic value has been measured to be several
hundred thousand to several million dollars. Total economic value has been found to be
consistently greater than and measured up to thirty times pecuniary value alone.
Although hedonic value damages are expressed as a ratio to economic value damages,
the two are assessed separately by a jury and have no interdependence. Mr. Smith testi-fies that each year of life expectancy has a hedonic value and that as far as economists
can determine the value does not vary from person to person. So, a fifty year old person
with a physical or mental disability has the same hedonic value as a fifty year old person
with no disability. Also, hedonic value for each year remains constant for a person's
entire life span, such that a person with twenty years to live would have exactly four
times the hedonic value of a person with only five years to live. Telephone interview with
economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
118. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 164.
119. Id. at 163.
120. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (Deering 1972).
121. The heir's derivative hedonic value could be expressed as a percentage of the
hedonic value of the decedent. Mr. Smith has not yet completed study on the theoretical
framework of the hedonic value structure; an evaluation of how hedonic value of one
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As long as judges consider themselves limited to granting recovery
for economic damages only, little hope exists for adoption of hedonic
valuation. Courts insisting on exact computation of economic losses
face situations in which the ascertainment of damages becomes as
arbitrary as the forbidden damages that courts refuse to acknowl-
edge. Questions arise, for example, concerning the economic value of
a decedent who was unemployed. Courts are then forced to consider
the person's potential for future employment, the education accumu-
lated to date and that likely to be pursued in the future, and so on.122
The end result is to reduce to a meaningless number the value of the
life of an individual whose economic potential is unknowable. Recov-
ery for hedonic value, while admittedly difficult to ascertain, at least
confronts the inevitable truth that the value of human life cannot
and should not be so crudely quantified.
CONCLUSION
California courts have continued to deny recovery for mental
anguish damages in wrongful death actions despite strong counter-
vailing policy and established law mandating change. This Comment
has concentrated on California wrongful death case law, noting the
inconsistency and unfairness inherent in a system reflecting outdated
principles. The potential exists, however, for progress toward full
compensation for wrongful death plaintiffs; in Krouse v. Graham,
the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that reform can be effected
when the need is recognized.
The general nature of California's wrongful death statute has
placed responsibility for damage development wholly within the
province of the courts. Justice Tobriner recognized the trend toward
complete judicial control, stating, "I find nothing in the statute or its
history which anticipates and forbids the evolution of recovery for
wrongful death into a universally recognized right of common law
status.'
123
The need for further reform in death actions is evident, especially
as substantial damage awards for emotional distress in corpse mis-
handling and personal injury cases become more commonplace.
Courts should strive for consistency in the law; the unjustifiable rift
person is transmitted to another will be discussed in his forthcoming paper. Telephone
interview with economist Stanley Smith (Sep. 3, 1986).
122. Fox v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 565, 184 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1982).
123. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97, 111 (1977) (Tobriner, Acting C.J., concurring).
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between damages allowed in wrongful death actions and damages
allowed in other cases is the epitome of inconsistency. The step to-
ward correction is a small one: the California Supreme Court need
simply declare that juries may award damages for legitimate, estab-
lished forms of injury. 124
Although a decision to allow hedonic value damages is not likely
in the near future, recognition of mental anguish damages in death
actions is supported by common law and common sense. Wrongful
death actions represent the culmination of a traumatic emotional ex-
perience for the heirs of the deceased. Damage awards must be con-
sidered carefully to ensure that deserving plaintiffs are as fully com-
pensated in wrongful death actions as they are in liersonal injury
litigation.
THOMAS E. COURTNEY, JR.
124. California courts traditionally have been viewed as pioneers in the tort law
field. A California decision to recognize mental anguish damages likely would influence
other courts to do the same. One example of California's influence is the Montana Su-
preme Court's decision to allow damages for mental anguish. The dissenting justice ar-
gued that the court should not recognize such damages because California courts, con-
fronted with a similar wrongful death statute, have refused to grant recovery. Dawson v.
Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983) (Weber, J., dissenting).
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